Employer’s Duty to Report Crimes: Trade Secrets & Computer Fraud

by:  Hayes Hunt and Jonathan Cavalier

police telephone.jpgOver the past decade, many European countries have passed laws mandating that individuals and employers report criminal conduct.  In the United States, however, individuals are typically not required to report criminal conduct that they have observed.  Likewise, employers have no general duty to report criminal conduct by their employees.  Often, this lack of an affirmative duty or any other incentive to report criminal conduct will lead an employer to simply look the other way, rather than risk disrupting workflow, losing a valuable employee, bringing negative publicity on the company or facing liability for invasion of privacy or defamation. Consider the following scenario:

SCENARIO: A salesperson for a manufacturing company is having a record-setting year.  His sales are continually the best in the company.  Another employee notices a competitor’s price list and contacts sheet on his desk.  When asked about these materials, the employee reveals that he used to work for the competitor and that, when he left, his former supervisor failed to disable his computer access.  He has since continued to log in to his former employer’s system to gain access to information that enables him to undercut his competition on price.  What should his current employer do?

 

businessman.jpgThe employee above is likely breaking at least two federal laws.  First, he is certainly violating the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which prohibits, among other things, knowingly accessing a protected computer with intent to defraud and to obtain anything of value.  He is also likely violating Section 1832 of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, which criminalizes misappropriation of a trade secret with the intent to convert the trade secret to the economic benefit of someone who is not the rightful owner.  He is also likely violating a slew of state laws regarding computer fraud and trade secret protection.

It goes without saying that the employee should be severely disciplined for his conduct, which has subjected the employer to potential civil and criminal liability.  The best course of action may be to terminate the employee.  Should the employer report his conduct to the authorities? On one hand, if the employer keeps the conduct of the employee in-house, the situation could blow over.  This is a huge risk.

If, however, the conduct is discovered by the competitor, a lawsuit is sure to follow and the competitor may report the individual’s actions to the appropriate authorities.  In the latter situation, reporting the employee to the authorities would have gone a long way toward establishing that the employer does not authorize or condone such trade secret theft and that, when confronted with a rogue employee, the employer took swift and decisive action to prevent the conduct from reoccurring.

trade scecret.jpgThe key to avoiding this kind of dilemma is to prevent the criminal conduct from occurring in the workplace.  Employers should institute a trade secret policy which clearly specifies that employees are not encouraged, authorized or permitted to use trade secrets or confidential information belonging to competitors and that, if an employee is caught using such information, he will be subject to severe discipline.  By establishing and enforcing such a policy, employers can gain significant protection against suits for trade secret misappropriation and  unfair competition.

 Published in The Legal Intelligencer on 4/18/12.

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Posted in Corporate Compliance

An Employer’s Duty to Report Crimes by Employees: Company-Owned Daycare Center

by:  Hayes Hunt and Jonathan Cavalier

hobby horse.jpgOver the past decade, many European countries have passed laws mandating that individuals and employers report criminal conduct.  In the United States, however, individuals are typically not required to report criminal conduct that they have observed.  Likewise, employers have no general duty to report criminal conduct by their employees. 

However, not all situations are created equally, not all crimes are treated the same, and exceptions exist that may require employers to report the criminal actions of their employees.  Consider the following scenario:

 SCENARIO: A Fortune 500 company is committed to developing a family-friendly workplace.  The company has developed industry-leading flex initiatives, benefits for working mothers, and extended pregnancy and child-care leave programs.  The company has won numerous awards and is recognized as one of the best places to work for workers with children.  One of the company’s newest initiatives is an on-site, company-owned daycare center for children of employees.  One daycare staffer notices that a 5-year-old child frequently arrives at the center with suspicious bruising on his arms and legs.  What obligations does the employer have in such a situation?

All 50 states have passed laws regarding the reporting of suspected child abuse.  While some states require anyone who reasonably suspects child abuse to report it most states define certain specific groups of professionals that must report such abuse.  These groups typically include types of jobs that require regular interaction with children, like teachers, doctors, social workers and law enforcement officers.  These laws generally require the reporter to call a designated reporting hotline and provide the suspected abuser’s name and other identifying information.  Some states allow the reporter to remain anonymous.  In most states, a good faith report of suspected child abuse provides immunity for the reporter. 

 

teeter totter.jpgIn all states with such laws, daycare centers are designated as mandatory reporters of suspected child abuse, as are any persons paid to care for a child in a public or private facility.  Pennsylvania expressly mandates that any staff of a daycare center that has reason to believe that a child enrolled in the facility has been abused is required to report it.  These laws cover and apply to daycare centers run as a benefit for company employees, even though the company is not in the “daycare business,” and even though only company employees may take advantage of the program.

Employers that offer daycare services to their employees should take steps to train the employees staffing the daycare center about their reporting obligations and the steps that they must take to spot and report suspected abuse.  Employees should be trained on the protections that the law offers for reports that are ultimately unfounded but made in good faith, and explain that the employee will not be reprimanded for following policy, even if mistaken.  The employer should also designate an HR person to field questions from daycare employees regarding reporting obligations. 

colored chalk.jpgFinally, employers should be aware that, depending on the state in which their business resides, mandatory reporting requirements for suspected child abuse may apply even if their business is not typically one associated with child care.  Employers should know whether they are subject to mandatory reporting requirements in their state and advise their employees accordingly.

 Published in The Legal Intelligencer on 4/18/12.

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Posted in Corporate Compliance

Employer’s Duty to Report Crimes: Employee Using a Personally-Owned iPad for Work Purposes

by:  Hayes Hunt and Jonathan Cavalier

computer with face.jpgOver the past decade, many European countries have passed laws mandating that individuals and employers report criminal conduct.  In the United States, however, individuals are typically not required to report criminal conduct that they have observed. Likewise, employers have no general duty to report criminal conduct by their employees.  Often, this lack of an affirmative duty or any other incentive to report criminal conduct will lead an employer to simply look the other way, rather than risk disrupting workflow, losing a valuable employee, bringing negative publicity on the company or facing liability for invasion of privacy or defamation.

However, not all situations are created equally, not all crimes are treated the same, and exceptions exist that may require employers to report the criminal actions of their employees.  Consider the following scenario:

Scenario:  An employee uses his personally-owned iPad for work purposes.  He uses the iPad for work when he travels and takes work home with him on it.  The employee brings his iPad in to have the employer’s IT personnel fix a problem with his email accounts.  While performing maintenance, the IT department discovers child pornography on the device.  Should the employer report the employee to the authorities?  Must the company report the employee and, if so, to whom?

This is perhaps one of the more difficult situations that an employer can face.  Unfortunately, with the proliferation of technology and the intermingling of employer- and employee-owned technology, this situation arises more frequently than anyone would care to admit.  When it does, the employer is often confronted with a problem of balancing the need (and desire) to report such an employee to the authorities with the potential exposure resulting from the employee’s potential privacy rights.

Recent changes to federal law have made the answer to this problem clear: the employer must report the employee.  18 U.S.C. § 2258A requires any provider of an “electronic communications service” or “remote computing service” to report information about the employee, including identity, email and/or IP address, or any other identifying information to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.  An “electronic communications service” is defined by the law to include “any service which provides to users the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”  In other words, any business which provides its employees with email is subject to the law, and penalties for violations are harsh.  Many states have passed similar laws requiring similar reports.

 

computer.jpgIn addition to these reporting requirements, at least one employer has been found liable in a civil lawsuit for failing to report child pornography found on a work computer.  In the New Jersey case of Doe v. XYC Corp., an employee was, among other things, visiting child pornography sites while at work and sending photos of his 10-year-old step-daughter to one of those websites.  He was later arrested for his conduct.  The mother of the 10-year old then sued XYC, alleging that the company knew, based on logs generated by the computer and complaints from other workers, that the employee was accessing child pornography at work.  While he was reprimanded by the employer, his conduct was never investigated or reported.  In reversing summary judgment in XYC’s favor, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court held that “an employer who is on notice that one of its employees is using a workplace computer to access pornography, possibly child pornography, has a duty to investigate the employee’s activities and take prompt and effective action to stop the unauthorized activity, lest it result in harm to innocent third parties . . . No privacy interest of the employee stands in the way of this duty on the part of the employer.”

Given the gravity of the conduct involved, few employers will hesitate to report an employee found to be in possession of child pornography on employer-owed computing equipment.  However, the situation can become muddied if the device in question belongs to the employee.  For instance, an employee may use a personally-owned smart phone or laptop for business purposes, and may avail himself of the employer’s IT department when in need of technical support.  How can an employer ensure compliance with the law without exposure to liability for invasion of privacy?

Police phone #2.jpgThe key to avoiding this conflict is to have clear policies on the use of electronic devices in the workplace.  An employer should include in its company handbook clear language notifying the employee that (a) any employer-issued equipment remains the property of the employer; (b) that the employee has no right of privacy in anything he does on that equipment; and (c) that the employer may access and search the equipment at any time and without notice.  Ideally, employees will be reminded of their lack of a privacy interest each time they log on to their computers. 

However, with the proliferation of personal technology, many of these policies are limited to company-owned computers and, therefore, do not go far enough.  These policies should be extended to cover employee-owned technology used by the employee on the job.  In short, if an employee wishes to use his personal cell phone, laptop or tablet computer for work purposes, he may do so, but he must waive any privacy right to the contents of the device and consent to searches of the device without future notice.  At a minimum, employers should require consent to search and waiver of privacy for any devices used by the employee that are serviced by the employer’s IT department.  At most, employers may wish to ban use of employee-owned technology on the job entirely.

Published in The Legal Intelligencer on 4/18/12.

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Posted in Corporate Compliance

Preview of the Roger Clemens Trial: The Rocket Faces a Challenging Lineup

By Stephen A. Miller needles.jpg

(Orig. published 7/11/11)

 

baseball.jpgIn the 2000 World/Subway Series, Roger Clemens hurled a broken bat at Mike Piazza.  In hindsight, we can ask: Was it “roid rage”? 

Clemens now finds himself on trial this  week in a real Washington D.C. courtroom concerning his use of performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs). 

Reportedly against the advice of counsel, Clemens testified under oath before congressional investigators on February 5, 2008, and again before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on February 13, 2008.  Clemens was unequivocal in his testimony that he had never used steroids or human growth hormone.  He even claimed that he had never discussed steroids or human growth hormone with anyone else. 

Tall tales to reporters result in public skepticism and mocking in social media.  Tall tales to government investigators result in indictments for perjury and obstruction of justice.

At trial, Clemens will have a tougher row to hoe than Barry Bonds, who escaped with only a partial conviction in April by a hometown jury on similar charges.  In particular, Clemens doesn’t have a Greg Anderson in this trial — someone who purportedly injected the defendant with PEDs but refuses to testify (and goes to jail for that refusal).  Here, the injector will speak.  Brian McNamee told his story to the same congressional committee as Clemens in 2008, and, while he did not endure a rigorous cross-examination like he will in the upcoming trial, the manner and substance of his testimony seemed strong.

The real kryptonite for the Clemens defense team, though, is Andy Pettite.  Clemens and Pettite are (were?) close friends.  The defense will try to discredit McNamee as an opportunist and other nasty things, but what can they say is Pettite’s beef with Clemens?  Throughout the process, he rocket.jpghas been a reluctant witness.  When forced to testify, he has corroborated McNamee’s claim that he injected Pettite with PEDs and — most critically — admitted that Clemens spoke about his own PED regimen.  This is a devastating double-whammy for Clemens: bolstering his chief accuser (McNamee) while delivering the coup de grace of a full confession.

The special nature of Pettite will be underscored at the trial in another way.  Clemens and Pettite shared many things over the course of their friendship, including the same attorney.  Rusty Hardin, who will represent Clemens at trial, also represented Pettite briefly in the days prior to the release of an investigative report alleging that both Clemens and Pettite used PEDs.  Government prosecutors alleged that rules of legal ethics prohibited Hardin from participating in any trial in which his former client was a key witness.  Hardin reached a compromise whereby he will not cross-examine Pettite at trial; that task will fall to another lawyer on Hardin’s team.  This move could serve to stress even more the special nature of Pettite in the trial because Hardin himself will appear to forgo confrontation of the prosecution’s key witness.

Last but not least, Clemens has made the prosecution easier with the broad scope of his absolute denials.  Perjury and obstruction of justice cases are notoriously difficult for prosecutors because good advocates can often highlight vagueness in a defendant’s responses.  Clemens did not traffic in vagueness before Congress.  He testified that he never used steroids or human growth hormone.  He testified that he never discussed PEDs with anyone.  Clemens gave absolute and definitive answers. He wasn’t being vague.

In the end, basic juror apathy may be the best hope for Clemens.  As defense lawyers tell each other all the time — and as prosecutors lament— “it only takes one.”  Criminal convictions must be unanimous, and if even one juror refuses to convict, the jury will hang, and Clemens will live to face another day in court.  The chances of persuading at least one juror are improved by the atmospherics here.  No one was killed or beaten.  Clemens is “only” accused of lying to Congress, a body that many people believe had no business conducting hearings on triflings like baseball in lieu of more pressing legislative priorities.  Some jurors might conclude that he did not obstruct a “real” law enforcement investigation and refuse to convict him on those charges.

It’s impossible to predict the result of any trial.  Even though “it only takes one,” the Rocket faces a tough lineup at trial. 

S. Miller.jpgStephen A. Miller is a partner in Cozen O’Connor’s Criminal Defense and Governmental Investigations, Appellate, Commercial Litigation Group.

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Posted in Cross Examination

“Stand Your Ground” Laws – The Trayvon Martin Case & Neighborhood Watch Groups

Neighborhood watch sign.jpgBy:  Hayes Hunt and Calli Varner

The shooting death of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin in Orlando, Florida has focused tremendous attention on Florida’s contentious Stand Your Ground law, passed in 2005.  Since enactment, claims of justifiable homicide in Florida have more than tripled.  The Tampa Bay Times reports that the defense has been claimed in 130 cases, 70% of which involved fatalities. More than half of these cases, however, did not go to trial at least partially due to the invocation of the defense. 

So why are these cases not being tried?  Under common law, a person has a “duty to retreat” prior to using deadly force on another.  This aptly named “Castle Doctrine” applies when a person is in his or her home and has the right to use deadly force without first exercising the “duty to retreat.”   Florida’s Stand Your Ground law extends the Castle Doctrine outside one’s home to include public places.  Pursuant to the law, a person in any other place has no duty to retreat and has the right to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent death or bodily harm or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.  Once a person claims they felt as though the use of deadly force was necessary to protect themselves it becomes difficult to investigate and ultimately to prosecute.  This is especially true where, as is often the case, there are no third-party witnesses and, as in the Martin matter, the only witness other than the shooter is dead. 

Neighborhood watch.jpgThe Stand Your Ground law becomes even more controversial when the defense is claimed by members of neighborhood watch groups.  Florida is considering a bill that would require neighborhood watch groups to register, since there are no laws or regulations governing such organizations.  The purpose of these groups is to promote safety and reduce crime by reporting suspicious activity to local law enforcement.  One concern over Florida’s Stand Your Ground law is that it allows these groups to go even further — and use deadly force to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.  Opponents argue that this portion of the statute encourages vigilantism by providing a broader justifiable defense for pursuing and shooting another person. 

The shooter in the Martin case, George Zimmerman, based on his conversation with 911 dispatch (listen:  2FXV_call1.wav), did not merely watch and report.  Zimmerman pursued Martin despite being requested not to do so.  In this instance, the civic principles of “watch and report” accelerated into “follow and confront.” To date, Zimmerman has not been charged with a crime. 

The Martin case is still being investigated at the local level and by federal Justice Department officials.  A task force has been established by a group of Florida legislators to examine whether any changes are needed to the law or simply repeal it.  Lawmakers need to decide whether Stand Your Ground law is a necessary extension of self-defense or, rather, promotes vigilantes to kill in the name of the law.

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Posted in Prosecution & Defense

Legislating Transparency & The Supreme Court’s Reluctance to Televise Oral Arguments

by Hayes Hunt and Brian Kint

Satellite dishes #1.jpgLast week, the Supreme Court heard nearly six hours of oral argument from some of the brightest legal minds in the world in deciding the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act a/k/a Obamacare.  The Court’s decision in this case will directly touch nearly all of the 310 million people in the nation. However, only 250 people had a chance to witness last week’s historic argument before the Supreme Court.

You can tune in to C-SPAN and watch a live broadcast of Congress debating healthy food initiatives.  You watch the President address the nation from the Oval Office.  Yet, the actual workings of the Supreme Court remain a mystery to the majority of the public.  For most, the only way to watch a Supreme Court oral argument is to go to Washington D.C., wait in a long line outside the courtroom, and, if you are lucky, get one of the courtroom’s 250 publicly available seats.  At lunchtime, you must leave, queue up again, and hope to reclaim your seat for the afternoon session.

The Senate Judiciary Committee recently took a step to force the Court to become more accessible, voting to advance a bill that would permit television coverage of open sessions of the Supreme Court. As a procedural safeguard, a majority of the justices may decide that allowing coverage in any particular case would violate a party’s due process rights. Known as the Cameras in the Courtroom Act, this proposed legislation has sparked debate about the need for openness in government and the respective powers of Congress and the Supreme Court.

This development is just the most recent salvo in the conflict between Congress and the Court over public access.  Congress has introduced similar legislation nearly every year since 2000, after unsuccessfully urging the Court to televise arguments in Bush v. Gore.  In response, the Court has implemented a number of pilot programs to evaluate the effect of cameras on court proceedings.  All of these programs, however, have been limited to the lower federal courts, leaving the Supreme Court untouched.

Tv#2.jpgHistorically, the Court has been inaccessible.  Early Justices primarily “rode circuit,” bouncing from town-to-town, holding sessions wherever they could.  When the federal government moved to Washington D.C., the Court did not receive its own building but was eventually settled into a basement room in the Capitol with barely enough seats for the lawyers, clerks, and court reporters in regular attendance.  The current 400-seat chamber must have seemed gargantuan when the Court finally moved into its own building in 1935. 

Some critics argue that Congressional legislation forcing television coverage of Supreme Court arguments violates the separation of powers doctrine; contending that this legislation is an impermissible mandate telling the Court what to do.  Yet, in many areas of judicial administration, it is Congress who has been given the mandate to tell the Court what to do.  Congress decides how many Justices sit on the Court, determines the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, and stipulates many of the Court’s procedures.  Indeed, if Congress oversteps its bounds, the Court will overrule the legislation.  It is unclear, then, why so many balk at the simple proposition of requiring television coverage of oral arguments of the most independent branch of government. 

The Court’s concerns over cameras in the courtroom are similarly enigmatic.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53 has explicitly banned media coverage of criminal proceedings since the rules were adopted in 1946.  Ostensibly, this ban is in effect for fear that witnesses may alter testimony or jurors modify decisions, knowing that the proceedings are being broadcast.  Still, nearly all criminal trials are open to the public.  All one has to do is walk in and take a seat.  The Supreme Court recognized when ruling in the 1981 case Chandler v. Florida that televising a criminal proceeding does not necessarily violate the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.  Whatever the rationale underlying Rule 53, it is unlikely to apply to Supreme Court oral arguments.  Although they do sometimes involve criminal matters, they do not involve witnesses or jurors.  They involve fundamental questions of law that can have wide-ranging and long-term effects.

Chairs.jpgAs a Supreme Court Justice, Elena Kagan as well as the other members of the Supreme Court will ultimately decide the propriety of the health care legistration.  At her confirmation hearing, Justice Kagan called watching Supreme Court oral arguments “an inspiring sight.”  Fortunately, she was lucky enough to get a seat.

 

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Posted in The Bench

New Orleans Saints’ Bounty System and the Law

NFL #2.jpgby Hayes Hunt and Brian Kint

An investigation conducted by the NFL revealed that a number of defensive players and coaches from the New Orleans Saints maintained a “bounty” program.   As punishment, last week the NFL suspended Super Bowl-winning New Orleans Saints’ coach Sean Payton for a year for overseeing the bounty program.  Senator Dick Durbin of Illinois is in the process of creating a Judiciary Committee to debate making bounty systems in professional sports a Federal crime

The Saints’ bounty program violated league rules by giving cash bonuses to players for delivering hard hits to the opposing players.  The most controversial bounties were given to players who injured key adversaries.   Players earned more cash based on the severity and effect of the injury inflicted. Thus the rewards were greater if the quarterback sustained a concussion and had to leave the game than for a hit that required a right guard to sit out a down while his ankle was taped on the sideline. 

Generally, the law shields professional athletes from civil liability for their on-field conduct through the doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk.  Each play in a football game contains numerous hits that would be considered an assault and battery outside the chalk of the field’s lines.  Sometimes, players are hurt.  The injured player cannot sue the opposing player because he accepted the obvious risks inherent in playing an NFL football game, including the risk of being hit hard. 

NFL #3.jpgThere are similar impediments to imposing criminal liability for such conduct.  Can a legal hit in a football game ever be criminal, even if it was intended to hurt an opposing player?  It is one thing to carry brass knuckles onto the field and use them to harm another player — think Burt Reynolds and the “Mean Machine” in The Longest Yard.  Such behavior is clearly outside the scope of the rules and would invite criminal liability.  On the other hand, even if a player intends to hurt another player, a legal hit is unlikely to be criminal.  But what if the player “uses his helmet as a weapon” and injures another player?  The league has tried to stop these types of hits in recent years, but are they so far outside the rules as to be considered criminal?

Even assuming you could prove that a player had a guilty mind (because he participated in a bounty system) and committed a guilty act (in that he criminally injured another player), it would still be difficult to show concurrence of the two.  How could you show that the player intended to injure another player on any particular hit without an admission of guilt?

Was the bounty agreement a conspiracy to commit an illegal act?  While some state conspiracy laws require that one of the conspirators must commit an overt act in furtherance of the agreement, in other states, a conspiracy is complete when the parties come to an agreement.

Here is how the idea of a conspiracy may operate in the bounty context.  Being paid to hurt other players is outside the rules of football and creates risks not inherent in playing the game.  As a result, any hit associated with a bounty system is a criminal battery.  Coaches and players participating in the bounty system have agreed to commit the acts and the hypothetical conspiracy is complete. 

NFL #1.jpgThe ongoing NFL investigation has yet to determine just how and whether bounty systems are pervasive, or whether the practice was limited to the Saints.  Any player who wishes to pursue a claim for a ‘bounty-caused’ injury may be obligated to proceed with arbitration under the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement.  As a result, neither civil claims nor criminal charges are likely to ever see the inside of a courtroom.  That is, unless Congress decides bounty hunting in football is a crime. 

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Posted in Prosecution & Defense

Judge Rakoff & S.E.C.’s Policy of Settling Without Admissions of Wrongdoing – “HALLOWED BY HISTORY, BUT NOT BY REASON”

Rakoff #4.jpgBy Hayes Hunt and Jonathan Cavalier

Published in The Legal Intelligencer on March 21, 2012

“HALLOWED BY HISTORY, BUT NOT BY REASON” – Second Circuit Stays Judge Jed Rakoff’s Challenges to the S.E.C.’s Policy of Settling Without Admissions of Wrongdoing

On March 15, 2012, a panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay of the district court litigation brought by the Securities Exchange Commission against Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.  The district court had rejected a settlement and consent judgment agreed upon by the parties in a decision which threatens to disrupt the S.E.C.’s longstanding policy of settling cases without demanding an admission of wrongdoing.   

The decision stems from litigation filed by the S.E.C. against Citigroup alleging the company knew in early 2007 that the bottom was falling out of the market for mortgage-backed securities (in which it was heavily invested) and housed those assets within a new billion-dollar fund, which it positioned as an attractive investment option, rigorously vetted and selected by an independent investment advisor.  By doing so, Citigroup was able to offload much of its toxic mortgage-backed securities at a premium.  By the S.E.C.’s measure, Citigroup netted $160 million in profit while the investors in the fund lost $700 million.

In October 2011, the S.E.C. sued Citigroup for negligence in federal court in the Southern District of New York.  At the same time, the S.E.C. filed suit against an individual Citigroup employee, alleging that Citigroup knew that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to offload the mortgage-backed securities as part of a bundled fund if it disclosed the negative projections for those securities.  While the case against the individual included specific allegations that Citigroup acted with fraudulent intent, the S.E.C. omitted those allegations from its complaint against Citigroup.

At the same time that the S.E.C. filed suit against Citigroup, it submitted to the court a “Consent Judgment,” which was, in effect, a settlement of the S.E.C.’s negligence charges against the company.  Under the terms of the proposed settlement, Citigroup consented to an injunction prohibiting it from future violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3)of the Securities Act and was required to implement internal measures to prevent the kind of negligence alleged in the complaint from happening again.  Citigroup also agreed to turn over its $160 million in profit to the S.E.C. (plus $30 million in interest) and to pay a civil fine of $95 million.

In a practice long adhered to by many federal agencies,  the settlement included language that Citigroup was agreeing to the consent judgment “without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint.”  While the S.E.C. does not permit companies to settle while denying all wrongdoing, it has typically allowed companies to settle without admitting violations. 

Rakoff #2.jpgThe S.E.C. has followed this practice for decades with the justification that it promotes quicker settlements and allows the agency to focus its resources on preventing and correcting other fraudulent activities.  Citigroup was, of course, eager to settle the case without admitting wrongdoing, since by doing so, the company could avoid a finding of liability which would have collateral estoppel effect.  Such a finding would have made it much easier for fund investors to sue Citigroup, since Citigroup would be estopped from denying that it violated the law.

“Hallowed by History, but Not By Reason”:

Both Citigroup and the S.E.C. undoubtedly expected the settlement to be summarily approved by the Southern District of New York.  Judge Jed S. Rakoff, who has often criticized S.E.C. settlements in the past, had other ideas.  After Judge Rakoff issued an order requiring both parties to answer questions concerning the settlement in writing and held oral argument, he determined that he could not approve the settlement. 

In rejecting the settlement, Judge Rakoff applied a standard that required the Court, before approving the settlement, to determine whether the agreement was “fair, reasonable, adequate and in the public interest.”  According to Judge Rakoff, protecting the public interest was an important concern in settlements of this type:

“Purely private parties can settle a case without ever agreeing on the facts, for all that is required is that a plaintiff dismiss his complaint. But when a public agency asks a court to become its partner in enforcement by imposing wide-ranging injunctive remedies on a defendant, enforced by the formidable judicial power of contempt, the court, and the public, need some knowledge of what the underlying facts are: for otherwise, the court becomes a mere handmaiden to a settlement privately negotiated on the basis of unknown facts, while the public is deprived of ever knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public importance.”

Judge Rakoff expressed serious misgivings about “the S.E.C.’s long-standing policy – hallowed by history but not by reason – of allowing defendants to enter into Consent Judgments without admitting or denying the underlying allegations.”  Because the consent judgment would permit Citigroup to settle the case without admitting wrongdoing, Judge Rakoff noted that the defrauded investors would be left without a finding that Citigroup violated the law.  Furthermore, Judge Rakoff noted that “Citigroup was able, without admitting anything, to negotiate a settlement that (a) charges it only with negligence, (b) results in a very modest penalty, (c) imposes the kind of injunctive relief that Citigroup (a recidivist) knew that the S.E.C. had not sought to enforce against any financial institution for at least the last 10 years, and (d) imposes relatively inexpensive prophylactic measures for the next three years.”  In sum, “If the allegations of the Complaint are true, this is a very good deal for Citigroup; and, even if they are untrue, it is a mild and modest cost of doing business.”

Rakoff #3.jpgJudge Rakoff closed with some harsh words for the S.E.C., which he viewed as gaining nothing from the settlement but a “quick headline”: “But the S.E.C., of all agencies, has a duty, inherent in its statutory mission, to see that the truth emerges; and if fails to do so, this Court must not, in the name of deference or convenience, grant judicial enforcement to the agency’s contrivances.”  Consequently, Judge Rakoff found that the settlement was “neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate, nor in the public interest” and set a date for trial.

The Appeal and Stay:

Citigroup, now staring at a trial, and the S.E.C., faced with the rejection of its decade-old settlement practices, jointly appealed Judge Rakoff’s rejection of the settlement, petitioned for mandamus relief, and moved for a stay of the district court proceedings pending a decision on the merits.  Notably, Judge Rakoff, whom the parties had also petitioned for a stay, strongly disagreed with the parties’ position and questioned the legal basis for the parties to appeal his decision. 

On March 15, 2012, a panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the parties’ request for a stay.  In considering the request, the panel considered whether the parties had shown a likelihood of success on the merits and whether a stay would prevent irreparable harm or injure other parties or the public.  While the Second Circuit quickly found that the application for stay met the latter prongs, its decision was notable for its finding that the parties had shown a substantial likelihood of success in overturning Judge Rakoff’s decision rejecting the settlement.

First, the panel disagreed with Judge Rakoff that the settlement failed to serve the public interest.  According to the panel, Judge Rakoff erroneously assumed that the S.E.C. could easily establish liability against Citigroup but instead chose to settle for no good reason.  Further, the panel determined that Judge Rakoff had failed to give deference to the S.E.C.’s own determination that the settlement was in the public interest, noting that while the S.E.C. believed the $285 million settlement was in the public interest, Judge Rakoff “simply disagreed.” 

Second, the panel took issue with Judge Rakoff’s determination that Citigroup should not be permitted to settle without admitting liability. Such a requirement would, according to the panel, undermine most chances for compromise.

Third, the panel viewed Judge Rakoff’s decision that an agency settlement could not be approved unless wrongdoing was specifically admitted or denied as tantamount to a ruling that a court could not approve an agency settlement representing a compromise. 

While the panel’s decision merely stays the district court litigation while the merits appeal is pending, the panel’s discussion certainly indicates that Judge Rakoff may be ordered to approve the settlement.

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Certainly, any corporate entity that is subject to suit by a federal agency can breathe a bit easier after the Second Circuit panel’s order.  The prospect of being forced to admit wrongdoing before settlement can proceed is troubling to any company.  However, even if the Second Circuit ultimately reverses Judge Rakoff, the impact of his initial rejection of the settlement may still cause problems for companies looking to resolve agency lawsuits quickly and without collateral estoppel effect.  More courts may follow in Judge Rakoff’s footsteps in more deeply reviewing settlements, rather than simply rubber-stamping the agency’s determination.

Corporate counsel would be wise to pay careful attention to the language used in crafting settlement agreements and consent judgments with federal agencies.  If facts can be acknowledged and either admitted or denied without an admission of wrongdoing or impacting the company’s underlying liability, the chances that a federal court will approve the settlement will likely increase. 

Unless and until the Second Circuit reverses on the merits, the S.E.C.’s settlement policy remains in limbo.  If the Second Circuit affirms Judge Rakoff’s decision, expect to see the S.E.C. shift from use of federal courts to administrative actions as a way of policing its territory.

           

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Posted in Corporate Compliance

5th Amendment Self-Incrimination & Computer Encryption Passwords

By:  Hayes Hunt and Calli Varner

encryption #1.jpgComputer encryption software is no longer for the technologically advanced.  This readily available software allows average computer users to transform plain text into indecipherable symbols, inaccessible to anyone without a password.  With a few clicks of a mouse, computer hard drives become impossible to break into for advanced hackers and, even, FBI cyber squads. In response to this technology, prosecutors in Colorado were recently successful in obtaining a court order requiring a woman, charged with a crime, to meet with FBI agents and unlock files found on her laptop. 

Ramona Fricosu was indicted in 2010 for bank fraud connected to what authorities allege was a mortgage scam targeting people facing foreclosure.  Prosecutors claim the scheme defrauded banks of more than $900,000.  The FBI obtained a warrant and searched Fricosu’s home, recovering several computers, including a laptop containing the encrypted information.  The FBI asked Fricosu to decode the laptop, but she, understandably, refused and invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

Last month, federal judge Robert Blackburn ordered Fricosu to turn over an unencrypted version of the hard drive.  Although he recognized the long-standing legal principle that the contents of one’s mind is protected by the Fifth Amendment, Blackburn ruled that requiring Fricosu to unencrypt her laptop was not a violation of her Fifth Amendment right; Blackburn decided that the government already had evidence that she was the primary user of the laptop and they would not gain any additional incriminating evidence.  In essence, the existence of the files was a “foregone conclusion” that didn’t reveal any new information prosecutors didn’t already know. If that was true, there is little vailidity to compel her to unlock the computer for the prosecutors. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Blackburn’s decision and the case may end up in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.    

encryption #2.jpgThe Colorado decision comes after the 11th Circuit’s ruling that a suspect in a Florida case did not have to unlock his computer because doing so would be a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  In that case, the court determined that requiring a child-pornography suspect to unlock his computer would force him to “use the contents of his mind to incriminate himself or lead the Government to evidence that would incriminate him.” This case is distinguishable from Fricosu’s because the suspect had not yet been charged with the crime and the government did not know what, if anything, was on the suspect’s hard drive.  A decryption revealing child-pornography, possession of which is a crime in itself, would result in criminal charges against the suspect. 

On the one hand, requiring defendants to unlock their computers enhances the government’s ability to prosecute crimes such as fraud, terrorism, child exploitation and drug trafficking.  Although, conceptually, it is possible to de-code an encryption, it could take years, draining valuable government resources.  To reap the benefits of decryption, without violating the Fifth Amendment, the government could offer immunity to suspects in exchange for the decryption of their computer files.  While this option was not offered to the suspect in Florida, it was offered to Fricosu.  

On the other hand, this decision provides dangerous precedent.  While the Fifth Amendment isn’t triggered when the government merely compels a physical act, such as unlocking a safe-deposit box, it does protect testimony in which a person is forced to use “the contents of his mind” to state a fact.  When the government does so, they are requiring the person to assist in their own prosecution, in essence, “be a witness against himself.” 

Either way, it is likely that this issue will give the Supreme Court another chance to consider how technological advances affect the rights of the accused. 

 

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Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the High Seas of the Internet

Piracy #2.jpgBy:  Hayes Hunt and Brian Kint

Originally published in The Legal Intelligencer

Last month, Congress quickly shelved the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA) after incurring vocal public outrage led by web giants such as Google, and Wikipedia. SOPA and PIPA both sought to require the blacklisting of websites that facilitate online piracy. For example, search engines would have to exclude offending sites from search results and third-party payment processing companies like PayPal could not do business with them.

As originally drafted, the laws would have required internet service providers to block offending websites — an internet “death sentence.” The controversy over SOPA and PIPA puts into focus the tension between intellectual property rights and First Amendment free speech realities that many general counsel should bear in mind as their companies navigate the high seas of the Internet Age.

piracy #4.jpgAlthough the tension between intellectual property rights and free speech has always been present, in the past it largely was reconciled through limited enforcement. In the late 18th century, only the most dedicated infringers would have taken the time to undertake the arduous process of reproducing another’s work. For example, early printing presses could reproduce a few hundred pages an hour, at best, and the operator had to set the type by hand for each page.

Throughout the years, however, technological advances made the reproduction process quicker and easier. By the end of the 20th century, technologies such as the photocopier, the cassette recorder and the VCR gave people the ability to reproduce entire works with the push of a button. Still, these reproductions were of inferior quality. Think about a bootleg copy of Bruce Springsteen’s “Born in the U.S.A.” or the ubiquitous “mix tape” of the 1980s. Enforcement remained lax and focused on large-scale commercial infringers, not on individual consumers.

Digital technology and the advent of the internet changed everything. Digital technologies such as CDs, MP3s, and MPEGs allowed users to copy a work an infinite number of times with no reduction in quality. They could make numerous copies with a few clicks of a mouse. Then, the internet gave them the ability to distribute these copies to a worldwide audience. No longer were individual infringers a few isolated households with the money to purchase two VCRs and make a copy of their three-day rental of “Raiders of the Lost Ark.” Instead, a single person could distribute a high-quality reproduction of a song, movie, book, or picture to people across the globe — instantly — and at little cost.

This new reality led to a change in civil enforcement strategy for many companies. Instead of focusing on large-scale commercial infringement, many industries began to target consumers of pirated material. Their litigation strategy was intended to deter individuals from sharing files across the internet. The prototypical example of this strategy is Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, in which a number of recording companies obtained a $675,000 judgment against a college student who illegally downloaded 30 songs. Joel Tenenbaum had downloaded the songs for his personal use through the peer-to-peer file sharing application Kazaa. He was found liable despite his argument that private, noncommercial copying constitutes permitted “fair use” under federal copyright laws. The case is currently in front of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts to determine if the damages awarded should be reduced.

piracy #6.jpgTechnological changes created new challenges in criminal enforcement as well, as illustrated by a recent case. On Jan. 19, federal prosecutors seized and shut down the website Megaupload.com and charged seven of its executives with internet piracy. Megaupload is a website that allows users to upload and transfer large files, often music or movies. The website is based out of Hong Kong, but some of the allegedly pirated content was hosted in Virginia. None of the seven executives charged is a U.S. citizen or resident. If convicted, they face up to 20 years in prison. The case raises three of the most pertinent issues of contemporary anti-piracy law.

First, it raises questions of legitimate use. Usually, technologies that “facilitate” piracy have legitimate, noninfringing uses as well. For example, file-hosting services — such as Megaupload — allow users to store large files in a “Web locker” so that anyone, anywhere, can access them, as long as they have a computer with an internet connection. This technology is important to businesses in a global economy and it will become even more important as data moves off of individual computers and into the aptly named “cloud.” Nevertheless, skeptics argue that professed legitimate uses are simply a front to disguise the true intent of facilitating or encouraging piracy.

This dilemma is not new. Since the 1984 U.S. Supreme Court case Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., courts have struggled to formulate and apply a standard of liability for manufacturers of products or technologies asserted to be aiding copyright infringement. There, the film industry attempted to hold VCR manufacturers liable for “contributory infringement” for providing a technology that consumers could use to record and copy movies. The court ruled that the manufacturers were not liable because the device had significant noninfringing uses. Yet, the case is not so clear when considering internet technology providers that — unlike VCR manufacturers — often route activity through centralized servers, allowing them to control consumer activity in a way that was impossible in the past.

That leads to the second issue raised by the Megaupload case: the responsibility of a website provider for the content of the site. The internet is inherently open and collaborative. Many websites simply provide a forum and users provide the content. For example, YouTube’s content is primarily user-uploaded video clips. And even where the website provider delivers the majority of the content, users are often invited to post comments and discuss the content. User message boards and user-generated content are commonplace on news sites, blogs, and social networking sites. This environment begs the question of what responsibility a website provider has to monitor the site and remove offending content. Courts and the law are struggling to draw this line in a way that effectively balances intellectual property rights with the openness of the internet.

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Finally, the case raises issues of jurisdiction in the Internet Age. For the most part, intellectual property laws are limited geographically. What is legal in one country may be forbidden in another. Nevertheless, the internet allows businesses to reach across jurisdictional lines while maintaining a physical presence in a single country. While it seems odd to believe that a company can subject itself to every jurisdiction in the world simply by posting something to the internet, it seems equally odd to believe that a company can shield itself from all liability simply by running its operations from a country with weak intellectual property laws. Consequently, internet anti-piracy cases raise questions of exactly where a violation occurred, what country’s intellectual property law applies and whether a country can enforce its laws against a particular entity or person. These issues have blurred traditional jurisdictional lines and concepts of due process.

Many of these issues are not unique to intellectual property law. Yet, the digital age and the internet revolution undoubtedly have made the world of intellectual property and anti-piracy more complex than ever. Company decision-makers need to completely understand the law, the company’s internet presence and the ways consumers use the websites and online services the company provides. Executives and corporate counsel must manage the business of the internet. This task requires them to recognize and negotiate many pitfalls, obstacles, and booby traps — much like Indiana Jones as he searched for the Ark of the Covenant.

 

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Posted in Corporate Compliance
About the Editor
Hayes Hunt concentrates his practice in the representation of individuals, corporations and executives in a wide variety of federal and state criminal law and regulatory enforcement matters as well as complex civil litigation. Hayes is a partner in the firm's Commercial Litigation Department as well as its Criminal Defense and Governmental Investigations Group.
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