Fifth Amendment Fundamentals - Taking the Nickel

By Hayes Hunt and Jonathan R. Cavalier

nickel.jpgMost in-house lawyers, if they're fortunate, haven't bumped up against the Fifth Amendment and its related issues since the bar exam. After all, the so-called "nickel" typically arises solely in the criminal context, and corporations don't have the right to plead the Fifth Amendment at an organizational level. However, with governmental investigations of varying types on the rise, and in-house counsel advising the corporation and preparing witnesses for participation in these investigations, the Fifth Amendment and its protections are an important tool in protecting the company and its employees from self-incrimination.

FIFTH AMENDMENT FUNDAMENTALS

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This privilege against self-incrimination has been defined as the constitutional right of a person to refuse to answer questions or otherwise give testimony against himself or herself. To plead the Fifth, or to "take the nickel," is to refuse to answer a question from a governmental body because the response could provide self-incriminating evidence of an illegal act.

Importantly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that "a witness may have a reasonable fear of prosecution and yet be innocent of any wrongdoing. The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances," as the court held in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). The Fifth Amendment is intended to protect "the truthful responses of an innocent witness" where the responses of such a witness might provide the government with "incriminating evidence from the speaker's own mouth," as the court held in Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001). The privilege is thus available to both the innocent and the guilty. Importantly, the privilege protects statements that might incriminate the witness regardless of the likelihood of prosecution; rather, the witness must simply have a reasonable fear that his or her responses might self-incriminate.

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Coercive Litigation Tactics - Playing Hardball in The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Micron Technology Inc.

By Hayes Hunt and Thomas M. O'Rourke

ball&bat.jpgIt is not uncommon for the parties to play hardball litigation to exert pressure on the other side to settle a case.  But if your opposing party engages in tactics that you perceive to be coercive, should you immediately seek relief from the court?  A recent decision illustrates some of the issues to consider before you ask a judge to solve your litigation problems.

In The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Micron Technology, Inc., a patent infringement suit, the University alleges that Micron sold semiconductors that were made using its patented process.  Before the lawsuit, the parties had a collaborative relationship and Micron actively recruited the University’s engineering students to work in its facilities.   The lawsuit brought this relationship to an end.  An email from Micron’s Academic Program Manager to many of the University’s engineering professors in January 2013 read as follows:

Because Micron remains a defendant in a patent infringement lawsuit that [the University] filed against Micron . . . , effective immediately, Micron will no longer recruit [University] students for open positions at any of Micron’s world-wide facilities.

 

The University immediately demanded confirmation from Micron that it would not engage in any further communications of this kind.   Micron requested a legal basis for the University’s demand, which apparently was never provided, and refused to confirm that it would cease its communications.  The University then filed a motion with the court seeking “an injunction that prohibits Micron from sending similarly coercive correspondence to the University.” 

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Recusal - Judge Impartiality and Disqualification

By Hayes Hunt

balance.jpgRecently, the Chief Judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York refused to recuse herself from a case simply because her husband and his clients may have been the victim of the defendant’s efforts to hack a computer system.  Similarly, a Philadelphia judge acquitted a defendant/police officer and his verdict raised “concerns” that the judge was married to a police officer.

Since 2009, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. 556 U.S. 868 (2009), the issue of recusal has been a hot topic in civil and criminal litigation.  In Caperton, the Supreme Court ruled that a justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by not recusing himself in the case.  Recusal in the case was sought after the appellant’s chairman and principal officer gave a substantial donation to the justice’s election campaign.

28 U.S.C. § 455 governs disqualification of federal judges.  Pursuant to § 455, a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  (emphasis added).  A judge’s disqualification also is required in particular circumstances.  A judge is required to recuse himself when: (1) he has personal bias or prejudice towards a party; (2) he served as a lawyer in the matter; (3) he previously practiced with a lawyer involved; (4) has a financial interest in the matter; or (4) a person with whom he or she has a relationship is involved as a lawyer or party in the proceeding.  

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Upjohn Warning Update

man&puzzle.jpgBy Hayes Hunt and Michael Zabel

By now, the concept of Upjohn warnings should be familiar to any counsel, whether in-house or external, who represents a corporation's interests in an internal investigation. In a nutshell, an Upjohn warning is derived from the Supreme Court decision in Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), and is a mechanism for establishing corporate privilege by which corporate counsel explains to the corporation's officers and employees that when the individual officer or employee provides a statement to corporate counsel in the course of an internal corporate investigation, it is the corporation — and not the individual — that holds the attorney-client privilege for that statement.

A pair of significant cases in 2012 demonstrated just how important proper documentation of an Upjohn warning can be for establishing a privilege claim.

The first case is In re Google, 462 F. App'x 975 (Fed. Cir.google.jpg 2012). You probably read about the legal battle pitched last year between technology giants Google and Oracle. In February 2012, several months before a jury found that Google did not infringe on two of Oracle's patents, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that an internal email by a Google engineer was not protected under Upjohn because nothing indicated that the engineer had prepared the email "in anticipation of litigation or to further the provision of legal advice."

Google had argued that the engineer's email was made at the request of in-house counsel for the purpose of investigating Oracle's infringement allegations. In support, Google offered a declaration from its counsel that the email was prepared at his request. The Federal Circuit rejected Google's argument, observing that the content of the email itself suggested that the engineer's email was a response to a request from Google management relating to Google's pursuit of a license for Oracle's patents — and not a response to a request from counsel for assistance in the infringement suit.

Oracle.jpgThe second case is Custom Designs & Manufacturing v. Sherwin-Williams, 39 A.3d 372, 374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). Just as in the Google case, the court in this case rejected a corporation's privilege claim under Upjohn because the record did not indicate that the disputed communication was prepared at the request of counsel. In Custom Designs, the plaintiff was a cabinet company whose building caught fire and was significantly damaged. The day after the fire, a Sherwin-Williams employee visited the site of the fire and shortly thereafter prepared two memoranda addressed to Sherwin-Williams' in-house counsel. The cabinet company later sued Sherwin-Williams, alleging that Sherwin-Williams' products had caused the fire. In discovery, Sherwin-Williams claimed privilege with regard to its employee's two memoranda to its counsel.

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Will Pennsylvania Prohibit Discovery of All Attorney-Expert Communications?

By Thomas G. Wilkinson, Jr. and Thomas M. O'Rourke

experts.jpgIn 2010, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to address certain problems with prior expert discovery rules which were interpreted to allow discovery of virtually all communications between attorneys and their retained experts.  To combat rising discovery costs and ensure that attorneys and experts could speak candidly, the Federal Rules struck a compromise.  Rule 26(b)(4)(C) was added to extend work product protection to communications between attorneys and their retained experts, except to the extent the communications: (i) relate to the expert’s “compensation[;]” (ii) identify “facts or data” the expert considered; and (iii) identify “assumptions” that the expert relied upon in forming the opinion at issue.  Outside of these exceptions, attorney-expert communications are generally off limits. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on whether the work product doctrine protects attorney-expert communications.  Currently, however, the Court has pending before it an appeal and a proposed amendment to the Rules of Civil Procedure that will likely determine whether such communications will be discoverable in Pennsylvania. 

The Appeal – Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hospital of the Sisters of Christian Charity

The Supreme Court has granted review in Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hospital of the Sisters of Christian Charity, 2012 WL 3791328 (Pa. 2012), a personal injury case that raises significant questions about the scope of Pennsylvania’s work product doctrine.  In Barrick, the Defendants served a subpoena upon Plaintiffs’ medical expert, requesting all relevant medical files.  When certain records were withheld, Defendants filed a motion to enforce their subpoena.  In response, Plaintiffs asserted that the subpoena exceeded the permissible scope of expert discovery and sought protected work product. 

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Hurricane Sandy and Refusing to Evacuate: Criminal Law and Civil Liability

hurricane.jpgBy Hayes Hunt and Calli Varner

Hurricane Sandy’s death toll continues to rise and over 100 people have lost their lives to Sandy.  Some of the dead were residents who decided, despite orders to evacuate, to “ride out” the storm, a voluntary choice.  Let’s call these people “Storm Riders.”  

When a person chooses not to evacuate in light of mandatory orders to do so, they risk their lives as well as the first responders, who may need to rescue them.  Typically, a Storm Rider changes his mind after ignoring the evacuation order and realizes the gravity of the forecast.  According to New Jersey Governor, Chris Christie, Storm Riders were “stupid,” “selfish,” and put first responders in danger.  The National Weather Service even sent the following warning to those considering not evacuating: “THINK ABOUT THE RESCUE/RECOVERY TEAMS WHO WILL RESCUE YOU IF YOU ARE INJURED OR RECOVER YOUR REMAINS IF YOU DO NOT SURVIVE.”        

Despite warnings, however, many residents chose not to leave their homes.  Their failure to evacuate raises the potential of both criminal and civil liability.

Criminal Law

Some states have passed legislation providing for criminal sanctions for failing to obey an evacuation order.  One such state is New York.  Under New York law, in the event of a disaster or other like catastrophe, the chief executive, or mayor, can declare a state of emergency and order a mandatory evacuation.  See N.Y. Exec. Law § 24(1)(b).  The statute also provides that "any person who knowingly violates any local emergency order of a chief executive...is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." Id. § 24(5).  A person charged with a class B misdemeanor may face jail-time of up to threesearch&rescue.jpg months.  See N.Y. Penal Law § 70.15(2). 

Despite this authority, criminal sanctions for failing to evacuate are often not enforced.  For example, during Hurricane Sandy, Mayor Bloomberg assured those refusing to evacuate that they would not face arrest.  Not surprisingly, there has never been a criminal prosecution in New York related to this statute.  New Jersey has no criminal statute dealing with evacuation orders, however, as the death tolls rise from Hurricane Sandy that may change.

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Facebook "Friends", 4th Amendment Privacy & Probable Cause

By: Hayes Hunt and Brian Kint

keyhole.jpgA recent court decision has added support to the idea that there is no privacy on the internet.

In United States v. Meregildo, defendant Melvin Colon moved to suppress evidence seized from his Facebook account pursuant to a search warrant.  Colon did not challenge the issuing court’s decision that the search warrant application was supported by probable cause.  Rather, he challenged the government’s method of collecting evidence to show probable cause in its application for the search warrant.  Colon’s Facebook privacy settings allowed only his Facebook “friends” to view his profile.  One of these “friends,” who happened to be a cooperating witness, allowed the government to use his account to access Colon’s profile.  The government then collected information from Colon’s profile to use as evidence of probable cause to support the search warrant.

The Court denied Colon’s motion to suppress, reasoning that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information he allowed his Facebook friends to view.  Therefore, it ruled, the government may access this information through a cooperating witness without violating the Fourth Amendment.  The Court compared Colon’s Facebook profile to a number of other areas in which courts have found no reasonable expectation of privacy.  For example, the Court emphasized that an email sender loses the expectation of privacy when the email is delivered.  The Court concluded that “[w]hile Colon undoubtedly believed that his Facebook profile would not be shared with law enforcement, he had no justifiable expectation that his “friends” would keep his profile private.”

Facebook.jpgThe Court’s decision may have important implications for civil discovery.  For example, the Stored Communications Act prohibits companies providing electronic communication services from disclosing a user’s private information without the user’s consent.  There is no exception for civil subpoenas.  Facebook, therefore, regularly moves to quash civil subpoenas seeking such information.  The Meregildo decision, however, opens the door for an argument that a Facebook user’s personal information, wall posts, photos, etc. are not private information under the Act if they are shared with the user’s friends.  If that were the case, Facebook would be legally obligated to withhold only that information that a user keeps completely private.  Such an interpretation would produce a sea of change in the information available during civil discovery.

Video Interview: Discussing Twitter and Facebook Subpoenas, Guy Adams with LXBN TV

Following up on the From The Sidebar article co-authored by Jillian Thornton, Hayes Hunt had the opportunity to discuss Twitter and Facebook subpoenas with Colin O'Keefe of LXBN. In the interview, he speaks about when these sites may be forced to turn over information to the courts and what information they would give up. Also, he explains what role corporate partnerships may play as we touch on the Twitter suspension of reporter Guy Adams.

Facebook And Twitter Subpoenas, Privacy And The Law

shutterstock_78037219.jpgBy Hayes Hunt and Jillian Thornton

955 million people are Facebook users and there are 500 million Twitter users worldwide.  With these staggering numbers, social media is a goldmine or minefield for lawyers seeking information.  What happens when a lawyer sends a third-party subpoena to Facebook or Twitter about an individual? 

The answer is Facebook and Twitter will likely object on the grounds that the production of private information would violate the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“SCA”).  The SCA prohibits an internet company from disclosing a user’s private information unless the user provides consent. Courts have thus generally held that a party cannot obtain social-media data by merely sending a subpoena to Facebook or Twitter.  

Facebook takes the position that it is prohibited by the SCA from disclosing a user’s private information, and generally asks to dismiss a subpoena that asks for private information. See, e.g., Juror Number One v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 4th 854 (Cal. App. 3d 2012) (noting that Facebook moved to quash a subpoena under the SCA, and arguing that the requested information could be obtained from the user himself, who “owned” his profile information).  Facebook actually receives so many subpoena requests for user data that it currently dedicates a section of its online Help Center to answering questions about civil subpoenas. See Law Enforcement and Third-Party Matters, Facebook.

The SCA is not all-encompassing though.  For example, the SCA permits the government to compel disclosure of the basic subscriber and session information using a subpoena.  In addition, one court recently held that Twitter must produce user information in response to a criminal subpoena.  See People v. Harris, Case No. 2011NY080152, 2012 WL 2533640 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. June 30, 2012).  In Harris, the court denied Twitter’s motion to quash a subpoena to obtain a user’s information, email address, and posts for a certain time period.  Although Twitter argued that the user owns his tweets, the court held that users do not have standing to object to the criminal subpoena because the user has no proprietary interest in the informationshutterstock_89057599.jpg, nor does the user have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information shared with third parties.  “There can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in a tweet sent around the world.”  Id. at *3.  The court concluded that “[s]o long as the third party is in possession of the materials, the court may issue an order for the materials from the third party when the materials are relevant and evidentiary.” Id

You can expect to see more judges ordering Facebook and Twitter to produce “private” information in response to third-party subpoenas.

Predictive Coding - Clawing Back Privileged Documents

confidential.jpgBy Hayes Hunt and Jillian R. Thornton

With regard to privilege review, lawyers utilizing predictive coding of ESI need to be especially vigilant not to inadvertently produce privileged documents. Although predictive coding can be used to assess privilege as well as relevance, lawyers need to evaluate the benefit compared to the risk of disclosure. Under the federal rules governing clawback, a "disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work production protection ... does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure," as well as reasonable steps to correct the error. Thus, whatever method of ESI review lawyers use, it must rely on reasonable steps to prevent disclosure. This is a subjective standard, and lawyers using predictive coding would be wise to carefully document the process of how they code for privilege. In at least one federal case, the court has held that a party waived its right to attorney-client privilege by mistakenly producing privilege documents after employing a faulty keyword filter. See Victor Stanley v. Creative Pipe, 250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008). Part of the court's decision was based on the defendant's "regrettably vague" explanation of how the keywords were developed, how the search was conducted and what quality controls were employed. Thus, the need for precision in designing the search program and extensive quality control is obvious.

steps.jpgGiven the ever-expanding universe of ESI, most lawyers would be wise to consider using computer-assisted review and especially predictive coding. After all, the research has shown that predictive coding is more precise, makes fewer errors and identifies more relevant documents than human reviewers. This should not come as a surprise when one considers the differences in opinion among lawyers about what information is "relevant." When you add millions of pages of documents, fatigue plays a role for human reviewers. Based on these factors in addition to the dramatic saving of time and money, it is clear that predictive coding and similar methods are going to revolutionize how we conduct e-discovery.

Published in The Legal Intelligencer on June 27, 2012

What Judges are Doing with Predictive Coding

Merlin.jpgBy:  Hayes Hunt and Jillian Thornton

The difficulty with implementing processes such as predictive coding is that the technology is so new that these methods are fairly untested in court. However, the first wave of cases discussing the propriety of predictive coding has illustrated that it is indeed going to be accepted as an appropriate discovery tool. Earlier this year, in a landmark decision, U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck for the Southern District of New York authorized the use of predictive coding in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, No. 11-CV-1279, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23350 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012). Peck summarized his position, stating: "What the bar should take away from this opinion is that computer-assisted review is an available tool and should be seriously considered for use in large-data-volume cases where it may save the producing party (or both parties) significant amounts of legal fees in document review." The district court ultimately adopted Peck's evidentiary rulings in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, No. 11-CV-1279, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58742 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012). In his opinion, Peck was careful to point out that the plaintiffs consented to the defendant's use of predictive coding and the discovery dispute merely concerned the implementation of its use. Thus, lawyers were left to wonder what would happen if the parties did not agree to the use of predictive coding.

The same week that Peck's ruling was affirmed, a state court judge in Virginia approved the use of predictive coding in a case over the objections of the opposing party. In Global Aerospace v. Landow Aviation, No. CL 61040 (Vir. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012), 20th Judicial Circuit Judge James Chamblin ordered that defendants could use predictive coding, despite the plaintiff's objections that the technology was not as effective as manual review. Chamblin disagreed and ordered the predictive coding for the production of the defendant's ESI, provided that the receiving party would still have an opportunity to question the completeness of the contents of the production or the ongoing use of predictive coding. This opinion, although limited in its direct impact in other litigation, along with Peck's decision in Da Silva Moore, indicates willingness by the judiciary to incorporate predictive coding into e-discovery.bookshelves.jpg

Predictive coding and other automated methods of e-discovery obviously have limitations. Peck, in Da Silva Moore, emphasized that his approval of predictive coding was not universal: he did not order the use of predictive coding, he stated that computer-assisted review is not required in all cases, and that he did not endorse any particular vendor or predictive coding tool. In addition, it is the responsibility of the lawyers to understand the predictive coding program and how it works so that they can demonstrate the method's reasonableness if it is called into question. Just as with the traditional e-discovery tool of keyword searching, lawyers must engage in careful planning and sufficient quality control to ensure the accuracy of the program. Finally, lawyers should cooperate with opposing counsel and be transparent in their use and the scope of predictive coding in order to avoid unnecessary discovery disputes.

Published in The Legal Intelligencer on June 27, 2012

Predicting the Future of Predictive Coding

By Hayes Hunt and Jillian R. Thornton

old file cabinets.jpgA decade ago, document review meant a small militia of lawyers sitting in a windowless warehouse surrounded by bankers' boxes full of paper documents. Now, thanks to extreme information inflation, the bulk of document review takes place electronically. In order to keep up with the enormous volume of electronically stored information, lawyers have employed a method featuring a combination of keyword searches and manual review. Most importantly, e-discovery can be responsible for 70 to 90 percent of the client's cost of litigation. However, recently, the universe of ESI has expanded in exponential fashion. Exabytes have devoured the smaller gigabytes in the ESI pond. What's next? Predictive coding.

Predictive coding is being used to run algorithms that allow for computer characterization of a massive set of electronic data for a fraction of the cost of more traditional methods (i.e., a cadre of lawyers). Case law is now catching up to the technology and various judges are giving the green light for lawyers to employ predictive coding in e-discovery without running afoul of the rules. The proper use of predictive coding, especially in large-data-volume cases, provides huge benefits for lawyers and clients: Predictive coding of ESI takes much less time, saves a lot of money and is often as accurate or more accurate than manual review. Of course, predictive coding also can be problematic if, for example, privileged documents are disclosed.

A recent study by Rand Corp., which includes 57 case studies from eight large corporations, shows that the cost of e-discovery can be grouped into three main categories: collection, processing and review. Amazingly, the review phase accounted for 73 percent of thepaper.jpg costs incurred during e-discovery. Predictive coding works to drastically reduce the number of documents that are manually reviewed by lawyers. Here's how it works: The first step in the process is that lawyers review a small sample of documents and code those documents for relevance or privilege or subject matter. The software then studies the sample set and applies the coding principles that it has learned to a larger set of documents. Then, the lawyers review the computer-coded documents to further teach the program how to code. This program continues until the software identifies only relevant documents. After coding is finished, the software can be used to select a small, random population of documents for lawyers to perform quality-control checks. If errors are found, the lawyers code more sample documents until accuracy of the coding reaches an acceptable level. Then the review is complete. The software can reduce the documents that need to be manually reviewed from a set of 2 million, for example, to only 3,000 to 5,000 documents. Assume it takes a lawyer 60 seconds to review a one-page document and you can easily do the cost-effective math of predictive coding.

Published in The Legal Intelligencer on June 27, 2012

Uses of Social Media for Corporate Counsel - Investigating & Defending Claims

shutterstock_82374889.jpgby: Hayes Hunt and Jonathan A. Cavalier

By now, most litigators have bumped up against at least one or two social media issues in their practices. Social media has become a hot-button discovery issue and a potential source of valuable information in cases from personal injury to employment discrimination. Often, social media discovery requests are now included as a matter of course in individual plaintiff cases. Juries are using social media to broadcast, often improperly, about their cases while lawyers scour social media during voir dire looking for juror bias. Companies now frequently use social media to vet applicants, with some even going so far as to force applicants to permit company employees to access their various social media sites.

With Facebook expected to hit the 1 billion user mark in August and more than half of Americans using at least one social media platform, the importance of social media in business and everyday life will only increase. In-house counsel have no real choice but to become familiar with the various social media platforms, the issues these platforms create for their companies, and the pitfalls and advantages they present in management and litigation.

To that end, here is a way that counsel can use social media to their advantage. 

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When to Appeal Privilege Claims - State and Federal Differences

Supreme Court.jpgContributed by Thomas Wilkinson, Jr. and Issa Mikel

In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Harris, No. 8 EAP 20098 (Pa. 2011) (McCaffrey, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior rule that orders overruling claims of privilege are immediately appealable as of right under Pennsylvania law, rejecting a recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion to the contrary.

Francis Harris was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the killing of a witness who was scheduled to testify against him in a trial on aggravated assault charges.  After affirmance of the sentence, Harris filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act.  He argued that his attorney in the criminal trial had ineffectively introduced the testimony of a psychologist hired to testify at the sentencing hearing about past psychological trauma suffered by Harris.

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Effective Video Depositions -- The Director's Chair

By Benjamin E. Zuckerman of Cozen O’Connor

Nothing is more boring than watching a witness testify on videotape.  Especially after lunch.  Jurors who don’t nod off should be given prizes.

We live in an age of hyper-active movies, videos and TV shows.  Jurors are conditioned to fast-paced action.  Although trial videotapes don’t involve eye-popping martial arts battles, they can certainly be more interesting than they generally are.  You can produce a good videotape by exercising your inner Steven Spielberg. movieArt.jpg

You first need to consider the deposition background.  Too often witnesses are videotaped against boring monochromatic walls having no visual interest.  You can do better.  Use a library stocked with books as the background.  If your law office doesn’t have one, you can easily find one.  Consider a nicely furnished office with diplomas, artwork or other interesting items displayed behind the witness. Your videotape can take place wherever you choose, so think about where it can be done most effectively.

Next, consider what the witness should wear.  Doctors often are videotaped wearing white lab coats.  Perhaps your doctor should wear a shirt and tie without a jacket so that he seems less condescending and more caring.  Do you want to project your witness a hard working salt-of-the-earth kind of guy?  Have him wear a flannel or denim work shirt.  If your client is an executive with an unpopular corporate defendant humanize him.  Forget the dark business suit.  Have him wear something casual and warm.  You get the idea.

The deposition itself should avoid the single camera stationary head shot pitfall.  Work with the videographer beforehand.  Have the camera zoom in on the witness at appropriate moments.  Pan across to exhibits, models or demonstrations and then zoom in on them as the witness discusses them.  Use exhibits large enough to be seen clearly on camera.

Avoid off-the-record interruptions as much as possible.  Nothing is worse than a constant stream of “Going off the record at 1:32” and “We are back on the record at 1:34” off-camera pronouncements.  If your witness is going to refer to an exhibit, keep the camera rolling while she places it in view, walks to the easel where it is displayed, or otherwise prepares to talk about it.  Avoid jumpy interruptions when objections are voiced. Have them remain on the video and audio record.  If the witness was actually testifying in court the jurors would hear counsel’s objections and responses, so there’s no reason they shouldn’t hear them on the video.  Keeping the camera rolling has the added benefit of revealing your opponent’s obstreperous conduct. If necessary, ask for a ruling from the court on objections before trial and then have the video edited as smoothly as possible.

You may not win an Oscar, but if you produce quality videos for trial you have a bettter chance to win your case.

zuckerman_b.jpgBenjamin E. Zuckerman is of counsel in Cozen O'Connor's General Litigation Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of commercial and general litigation, including a broad range of civil matters.

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The Usual Stipulations - Deposition Mythology

medusa.jpg

Every lawyer has heard the phrase “usual stipulations” at their first deposition.  I swallowed a few four-letter words in my stomach the first time I heard the suggested “usual” stips."  Nothing was usual!  This was my first deposition and although I spent a week preparing, I was thrown from my saddle at the outset.

The other lawyers around the table started to nod approvingly at the “usual stips.”  To avoid embarrassment, I nodded along, although I had no idea what I was consenting to.  The stenographer typed away and I, seemingly, avoided a rookie mistake and went on with asking my questions.  I couldn't wait to get back to the office and figure out what the "usual stipulations" were and what I may or may not have agreed to. Turns out, I agreed to nothing and was subjected to a classic Litigation Mythology.

There are no usual stipulations.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29 (a) allows the parties to stipulate that a deposition may be taken “before any person, at any time or place, on any notice, and in the manner specified...”.  No answers there.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 doesn’t use the word “usual” in all the guidance it provides in taking a deposition.  If there is no rule, then there is nothing “usual” about an adversary proposing an unarticulated stipulation before you start a deposition. 

The next time you are asked about the “usual stipulations,” suggest that the deposition will proceed pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence.  Then politely and with complete confidence, ask what stipulations your adversary suggests.

I understand it may vary from state to state and am curious whether there is an actual rule which explicitly references "usual" stips and what they are.

Using Social Media for Discovery Has Ethical Implications.

By Thomas G. Wilkinson, Jr. and Lindsey E. WilkinsonhippieComputers.jpg

It has become common practice for lawyers to mine social media pages of parties and witnesses for discovery purposes.   But can the urge to dig up dirt on opposing parties cause lawyers and their staff to overstep the line into 'risky business' practices or even  potential for lawyer disciplinary consequences?  

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Witness Preparation - Ask Your Questions. Get the Right Answer

Q & A - ask answer (use this one).JPGWitness preparation is one of the most important components of trial and litigation practice.  A simple but overlooked part of preparation is asking your witness your actual questions.  You may have two or twenty essential questions that you must ask to prove your case or deal with the opposing counsel's anticipated cross exam.  I have watched many lawyers prep a witness with broad and indefinite questions as if asking a direct question is somehow unethical or suggestive.  On the contrary, asking your witness your questions is ethical and part of being a zealous advocate.  

Let the witness know there is nothing improper about your prep.  Tell the witness, especially a non-party, that opposing counsel is also preparing her witnesses.  You will always be protected from the suggestion of improper witness coaching by telling your witness from the moment you start to prep that she needs to tell the truth.

After the witness gets more comfortable with recalling the events of the case, tell the witness you are going to ask them word-for-word an important question.  Tell them your question and their answer is crucial.  Then ask the question.  Listen to each word.  Stop the witness when a choice of words, inaccuracies or demeanor needs to be discussed.  Talk to the witness about your concerns.  Work on each segment of her answer.  Ask the question again.  Get the right answer.  

 

Will, Kate and Royal Prenuptials

  By Jennifer Brandt

carriage.jpgWe all sat transfixed last week as Will and Kate finally tied the knot.  The pageantry and revelry accompanying their wedding was a fairy tale brought to life.  But, what went on between the couple in those weeks leading up to the big event? 

Did Will force Kate to sign a prenuptial agreement (even though in the UK they are not usually held to the same standard of enforceability as here in the US)?  Did she have to agree that if she failed to produce an heir to the throne, that she would walk away from the marriage penniless?  Did each party have to disclose all of their assets prior to their betrothal?  Was there a weight clause in the agreement, such that if Kate increases a few dress sizes, she would be banished from the kingdom?

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Changes, Cha-Cha-Changes - Deponent review and signature

Judge Martin C. Carlson of the Middle District of PA, sanctioned two non-party witnesses for providing false and misleading deposition testimony. According to Judge Carlson’s opinion the witnesses’ lies were not revealed until errata sheets were submitted by defense counsel.  It reminded me of how often lawyers provide inadequate instructions to a witness about reviewing his or her transcript.  Many lawyers will tell a deposition witness that they can review the transcript for any inaccuracies, mistakes or typographical errors.   Such instructions are a mistake in law and advocacy.  You want the deponent to sign the transcript and you are not afraid of any changes the deponent may make to his testimony.

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Rule 30(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the deponent or party must request that the transcript be reviewed for any changes.  Once the request has been made at the deposition, the deponent has thirty days, after being notified by the court reporter, to review the transcript. Pursuant to Rule 30 (e)(1)(B), the deponent must sign a statement (i.e. errata sheet) listing any changes in form or substance and the reasons for making the changes.

A fair and complete Rule 30 (e) request goes something like this: 

The court reporter has transcribed every question I asked and every answer you provided during this deposition.  The court reporter will send your lawyer a transcript of this deposition.jpgdeposition.  Once your lawyer receives the transcript, you have 30 days to review the transcript with your lawyer and make ­any changes you want to your answers.  You will make those changes on something called an errata sheet.  I’m showing you an example of an errata sheet. On this side of the form you can change your answer and explain the reason you made your changes. After you have completed your review, you must sign the bottom of the errata sheet.  Do you have any questions about your review of the transcript?   

Your Rule 30 (e) deponent-review request is imperative.  Your ability to effectively impeach at trial will include letting the jury know that the witness had ample opportunity to cure his inconsistent statement.  Bring a sample errata sheet to the deposition to show the witness when you are providing the above Rule 30 (e) request.  Also, invite the deponent to make changes – as an advocate, you welcome two different answers to the same question! 

A deponent’s answers will not necessarily end at the conclusion of the deposition.

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Impeachment on Direct - How to deal with unexpected testimony on direct examination - Part 2

Impeachment on Direct

How to deal with unexpected testimony on direct examination - Part 2

lady of justice - unexpected testimony (use this one).JPGYou call your last witness and things are going great.  A verdict in your client’s favor will be soon to follow.  All you have to do is establish that there was moonlight. 

Counsel: Was there moonlight at the time you saw the accident?

Opposing Counsel: Objection.  Leading and lacks foundation.

Court:  Overruled.

Witness: It was the sun.

Counsel:  Are you sure?

Opposing Counsel: Objection.  Asked and answered and leading.

Court: Sustained.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

The witness had previously said there was moonlight.  Invariably, your next question is “didn’t you testify that” and before you can finish the question your adversary stands up and objects.  The objection is sustained followed by deafening courtroom silence.  Before you say another word, you need to decide whether the witness:  (1) forgot that there was moonlight or; (2) believes it is the sun. 

• Impeachment •

We previously discussed helping the witness remember under FRE 612. Alternatively, If the witness insists that there was sunlight, you need to impeach.  At the moment the witness gives you an unexpected and inconsistent answer, she is hostile to you.  Your instinct is to pounce and ask leading questions. Your adversary is grinning like a Cheshire cat waiting to object to your next question.  You call a sidebar and tell the judge that the witness is a dirty-rotten scoundrel!  Meanwhile, the jury is chewing on the witness’s last answer while watching you squirm.  

It is a common mistake to believe that impeachment is solely reserved for cross examination.  You may impeach on direct.  Federal Rule of Evidence 607 provides that: “the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.”  The manner in which you impeach, at least to start, must be with non-leading questions pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 611 (c).  If you want to ask leading questions, you need to establish through non-leading questions, that the witness is actually hostile towards you or your client.  A typical example is a former employee of your client that has an axe to grind.  If you cannot get the witness to openly express antagonism, just impeach with non-leading questions.  Below are examples of questions you should ask the witness:

  • Mrs. Witness, did you provide a statement to the police an hour after the accident?
  • Did you want to provide the police officer with accurate details of the accident?
  • Did you provide the police officer with honest answers?
  • Did you review your statement with the police officer?
  • Did you read your statement to make sure you provided an accurate account of the accident?
  • Did you sign the statement after you reviewed it?
  • Your honor, may I approach the witness?  Witness, showing you what has been previously marked as Exhibit X.  Is that your signature?
  • What is the date next to your signature?
  • Directing your attention to paragraph 3 of Exhibit X.  Did you tell the police officer there was moonlight at the time of the accident?       

You have impeached the credibility of your witness on direct with the use of a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 613 (a).  The moon is still full and your case is still bright.    

How to deal with unexpected testimony on direct examination - Part 1 Refreshing Recollection

How to deal with unexpected testimony on direct examination -Part 1 - Refreshing Recollection

You call your last witness and things are going great. A verdict in your client's favor will be soon to follow.  All you have to do is establish that there was moonlight. empty witness seat - unexpected testimony on direct.jpg

Counsel: Was there moonlight at the time you saw the accident?

Opposing Counsel: Objection.  Leading and lacks foundation.

Court:  Overruled.

Witness: It was the sun.

Counsel:  Are you sure?

Opposing Counsel: Objection.  Asked and answered and leading.

Court:  Sustained. 

The witness had previously said there was moonlight.  Invariably, your next question is “didn’t you testify that” and before you can finish the question your adversary stands up and objects.  The objection is sustained followed by deafening courtroom silence.  Before you say another word, you need to decide whether the witness:  (1) forgot that there was moonlight or; (2) believes it is the sun.

• Rule 612 •

If you decide your witness has made a mistake as a result of poor memory, you merely need to follow Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and refresh the witness’s recollection in this order:

1.  Establish that the witness’s memory is exhausted on the specific issue or event.

You:  Do you remember whether or not there was moonlight?

2.  Establish that the witness’s memory may be refreshed by a specific document.

You: Would your memory be helped by reading the signed statement you gave to the police an hour after the accident?

You: Your Honor, if I may, I’d like to mark this as Exhibit X.  Showing opposing counsel Exhibit X.  

3.  Give the witness the document.

You: I’m giving you your signed statement.  Please read the third paragraph to yourself.

4.  Allow the witness to review the document.

You:  Have you had a chance to read the signed statement you gave to the police immediately following the accident?

5.  Ask the witness if her memory has been refreshed.

You: Is your memory refreshed regarding the accident?

6.  Take the document away from the witness.

You:  May I have Exhibit X, Witness.  Thank you. 

7.  Pause and ask your original question again.

You:  Now, Witness. Was there moonlight at the time of the accident?

Witness: YES!  Absolutely.  I’m sorry, I got nervous and forgot.  

Now that the witness has reviewed her statement, she apologizes to the jury for her mistake, smiles in embarrassment and is completely forgiven by the jury.  The moon is bright and your client’s case is back on track.  Don’t wait for re-direct/rehabilitation since a strong advocate would not ask a single question on cross. 

Part II next week.  Impeachment on Direct. 

 

Guess Who's Coming to the Deposition?

big ben no entry - guess who.jpgI was about to start a deposition at Stained Glass Factory located somewhere between Syracuse and Utica. The owner of the factory decided he wanted to sit in on the deposition of one of his employees. As a new associate, my knee-jerk response was to exclude the owner since he may influence the employee’s answers to my questions.  I quickly decided that the owner could attend the deposition since his company was a party in the case.  I created a record and explained that the witness’s boss was present in the room and asked whether the employee was concerned about her job.  My instinct that the owner could be present was right, but for the wrong reason. 

There is no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that excludes non-parties from attending a deposition. While we typically think of depositions as being private proceedings, a deposition can be very public. 

A deposition audience can be used as an advocate’s sword.  For example, counsel could invite media reporters, aggrieved family members, or former colleagues to influence and pressure a deposition witness.  Imagine that you are defending the deposition of the former CEO of a bankrupt company and it is standing room only for ex-employees that have lost their jobs and pensions.  Or perhaps, the parents and siblings are sitting across the table in your deposition which involves the death of their relative in a car accident.  There is nothing legally inappropriate or unfair about these audiences being at the deposition.  

A protective order is the advocate’s shield.  Rule 26(c)(1)(E) allows you to seek a protective order “designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted.” In addition, holding the deposition in your offices will allow you to control access to the deposition.  Another potential remedy for your client is to enter into a confidentiality stipulation and agreement at the onset of discovery. 

What should you do when you enter a conference room and see the angry moAngry cartoon - guess who's coming to the dep.JPGb of pensioners with pitchforks and torches?  Make a record.  Confer with opposing counsel and, if there is no remedy, you and your client should walk out.  Rule 30(d)(3) allows you and your client to adjourn the deposition to seek an order terminating or limiting the deposition because it is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to unreasonably annoy, harass, or oppress the deponent. To make a compelling record you need to make yourself an eyewitness.  Tell the court reporter exactly what you see. It is crucial that you provide an accurate and honest description of the audience.  Set up your 30 (d)(3) motion by establishing a detailed account of what is happening.  Meet with your client in the hallway and ask them if the audience will impact their answers and, if so, go back in the room and make your record. You want the judge to see that conference room in the record through the eyes of the witness.  If you are videotaping the deposition, use the camera to set up your 30(d)(3) motion.  Be Stanley Kramer for a minute and turn the camera to the audience, there is no rule that says the camera may only point in one direction. 

guess who's coming to dinner - Guess who's coming to the dep.jpgWhile Sidney Poitier, Spencer Tracy and Katherine Hepburn may not be a party to my case, they could be coming to the deposition.

Strike that.

Everyone's parents had a seemingly different remedy for the hiccups.  I had to hold my arms Milk bottle 2 - strike that.JPGstraight in the air while my mother slowly poured a glass of milk into my mouth. There would be a brief pause -- she and I would stare at one another wondering if I was cured. After a few seconds, I'd invariably hiccup some milk.  My mom and I did this at least a hundred times with limited success.  Despite probabilities, I'm still convinced it works. It is what I learned. 

Lawyers have frequent mental hiccups trying to formulate a question: get a person's name wrong, struggle to find a word, draw a blank. Asking a perfect question every time isn't easy.  Lawyers have a unique cure-all phrase to remedy asking a bad question. Yes, in law there is such a thing as a bad question. The next thing that comes from the attorney's mouth is the cure for the hiccup: Strike that. As if those two words somehow make it all go away. The court reporter just transcribed: Strike that.  The question you pitched is not a strike and there’s no umpire.  

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There are two instances when “strike that” is commonly used:  depositions and trial. We probably learned the phrase from watching others take a deposition or try a case. A deposition transcript with clear precise questions, especially on crucial issues, is invaluable.  You will use the transcript at any point in litigation including at trial.   A transcript or video deposition riddled with “strike that” makes your questions less important.  Witnesses have credibility and so do you.  At trial, the jury believes “strike that” has some legal meaning and will be inclined to ignore the question.  The lawyer also wants to excuse the question before the judge or her adversary makes an objection.  Her attempt to restart her question is understandable and valid.  However, her adversary can object:

Objection.  Your Honor.  I ask that counsel be instructed that the stenographer has a duty to transcribe and, in order to exclude any portion of the trial record, counsel needs to have a ruling from the court. 

My best guess is that most of us learned from practitioners using the common law principle “move to strike” after an objection.  Move to strike was an effort to preserve counsel’s objection for appeal relating back to the question or answer.

Another cure for the questioner’s hiccups is to try “let me rephrase”.   Fortunately, you don’t have to raise your arms every time you try it.